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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
ROY LEE GLASPER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
i Case No. 970439-CA 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(a) in that it is an appeal from a 
court of record in a criminal case not involving a first-degree or 
capital felony. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Was there sufficient evidence to support the Judge1s 
verdict of guilt on the charge of burglary? 
2. Were the burglary and theft part of a single 
criminal episode, thereby requiring the lower court to impose a 
concurrent term of incarceration? 
In reviewing the verdict for sufficiency of evidence, 
this Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the verdict and reverse if such evidence is so inconclusive or 
inherently suspect that a reasonable person would reasonably doubt 
the defendant's guilt. State v. Purcell, 111 P.2 243, 245 (Utah 
1985). 
Whether the burglary and theft constituted a single 
criminal episode is a question of law for which the lower Court's 
decision should be reviewed for correctness. State v. Thurman, 846 
P.2 1256f 1271 (Utah 1993). 
The issue of sufficiency of evidence was thoroughly 
argued by counsel for Defendant in his closing argument at the time 
of trial. (Tr. 129-133). 
The claim that the burglary and theft constitute a single 
criminal episode was preserved by counsel in the sentencing 
hearing. (Tr. of 7/7/97 at 7-8). 
TEXT OF AUTHORITIES 
1. A person is guilty of burglary if he 
enters or remains unlawfully in a building or 
any portion of a building with intent to 
commit a felony or theft or commit an assault 
on any person. Utah Code Ann., § 76-6-202(1) 
(1995). 
2. A person "enters or remains unlawfully" in 
or upon premises when the premises or any 
portion thereof at the time of the entry or 
remaining are not open to the public and when 
the actor is not otherwise licensed or 
privileged to enter or remain on the premises 
or such portion thereof. Id./ § 76-6-201(3). 
3. A defendant may be prosecuted in a 
criminal action for all separate offenses 
arising out of a single criminal episode; 
however, when the same act of a defendant 
under a single criminal episode shall 
establish offenses which may be punished in 
2 
different ways under different provisions of 
this code, the act shall be punishable under 
only one such provision; an acquittal or 
conviction and sentence under any such 
provision bars a prosecution under any other 
such provision. Id., § 76-1-402(1). 
4. In this part unless the context requires 
a different definition, "single criminal 
episode" means all conduct which is closely 
related in time and is incident to an attempt 
or an accomplishment of single criminal 
objective. 
Nothing in this part shall be construed 
to limit or modify the effect of Section 77-
8a-l in controlling the joinder of offenses 
and defendants in criminal proceedings. Id., 
§76-1-401 (Supp. 1997). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
&± Nature of the Case 
Defendant was charged by Information with Burglary of a 
Non-Dwelling, a Third-Degree Felony and Theft of a sum of over one 
thousand dollars, also a Third-Degree Felony. 
B. Course of the Proceedings 
A jury trial was set for April 2, 1997; however, before 
a jury was impaneledf Defendant waived his right to a jury trial 
and the trial was held before the Bench. The Judge entered a 
verdict of guilty of both offenses and the matter was set for 
sentencing after obtaining a pre-sentence investigation and report. 
Defendant was finally sentenced on July 7, 1997. 
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C. Disposition at Trail Court 
At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the Court 
entered a judgment of conviction against Defendant on both counts 
and committed him to the Utah State Prison for two consecutive zero 
to five year terms. 
D^  Statement of Facts 
On January 24, 1997, Defendant and a co-defendant, Shanta 
L. Venson (hereinafter "Venson") entered the Cedar City Deseret 
Industries store. Although it was shortly after closing time, 
Defendant and Venson were allowed into the store and were assisted 
by store personnel. While Venson was in the process of locating 
and purchasing a belt, Defendant took a bank bag containing cash 
and check for deposit and stuffed it under his shirt. He and 
Venson left the store with the bag. (Tr. 52-53, 56, 118-19). 
Although Defendant does not dispute the theft of the cash 
and checks, there was a dispute as to whether he committed a 
burglary. Such dispute arises because of the location of where the 
bag was obtained. The facts supporting the verdict of the Judge 
are that the bag was obtained from a desk in an office at the rear 
of the store.1 (Tr. 56, 58, 119). See also, Exhibit 13. 
The store manager testified that the office where he 
defendant maintains that the bag was obtained from near the 
front cash register. 
4 
believes the bag was taken from was left open and although there 
was a sign indicating "Manager", there were no signs on the door 
restricting entry by store patrons. The store manager also 
testified that had a store patron been found in the office, he 
would not have considered it trespassing, although he would have 
asked the patron to leave the office. Moreover, the store manager 
did not consider the Defendant's entry into the store after closing 
time to be trespassing. (Tr. 66-67, 70, 74). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I: There is not sufficient evidence to show that 
Defendant entered the store and office unlawfully. Therefore, all 
of the elements of the offense of burglary were not established 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
POINT II: The lower court acknowledged that the burglary 
and theft constituted a "single criminal episode." Accordingly, 
Defendant should have been punished for only one of the offenses. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF UNLAWFUL 
ENTRY TO SUPPORT THE JUDGE fS VERDICT AS TO THE 
CHARGE OF BURGLARY 
Based on Section 76-6-202 of the Utah Code, the elements 
of the offense of burglary are as follows: 
1. That the defendant enters or remains unlawfully in a 
5 
building or any portion of a building, and 
2. That the defendant so enters with the intent to 
commit a felony or theft or commit an assault. 
Utah Code. Ann. § 76-6-202(1)(1995). 
In the instant case, there is no dispute that Defendant 
intended to commit a theft and, in fact, did commit a theft of the 
Deseret Industries store. The remaining issue, therefore, is 
whether he entered the Deseret Industries store and/or the office 
unlawfully. 
The legislature has defined "enters or remains 
unlawfully" as entry "when the premises or any portion thereof at 
the time of the entry or remaining are not open to the public and 
when an actor is not licensed or otherwise privileged to enter or 
remain on the premises or such portion thereof." Id., § 76-6-
201(3) . 
No Utah appellate court has ever directly applied Section 
76-6-201(3) to a case similar to the one at bar. However, in 
Arable v. State, 699 P.2d 890 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985), the defendant 
entered a store open to the public and entered a walk-in beer 
cooler posted with an "Employees Only" sign. Thereafter, the 
defendant attempted to commit a theft. The Alaska Court of 
Appeals, interpreting a burglary statute using the terms "enter or 
remain unlawfully" just as Utah's, concluded that the defendant 
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entering of the beer cooler did not constitute a burglary. The 
court further concluded that the building had to be entirely closed 
to the public at the time of entry in order for a burglary to have 
occurred. The Alaska Court of Appeals reasoned as follows: 
Entry into a restricted area of a building 
which is otherwise open to the public is not a 
severe intrusion and is not likely to 
terrorize occupants; the public is generally 
licensed or privileged to be within the 
building. It is not the kind of entry that 
burglary is designed to reach. Under the 
state's interpretation of "enter or remain 
unlawfully," which would apply to anyone who 
is present in a place where he has no right to 
be, a shoplifter who stole from behind the 
counter, from a window display, or from a 
stock area would commit the crime of burglary. 
Fourth-degree theft, a class B misdemeanor (AS 
11.46.150), would become second-degree 
burglary, a class C felony (AS 11.46.310), 
depending on precisely where within a public 
building the defendant was standing when 
committing the theft. Classification of cases 
would hinge entirely on disputable 
distinctions between open and closed areas of 
public businesses, where boundaries between 
such areas are often unenforced and ill-
defined, inadequately marked and widely 
ignored. 
Id. , at 894 (citation omitted). See also, State v. Thomas, 210 
Conn. 199, 554 A.2d 1048 (1989); Commonwealth v. Cost, 238 Pa. 
Super. 591, 362 A.2d 1027 (1976); Champlin v. State, 84 Wis. 2d 
621, 267 N.W.2d 295 (1978). 
In the instant case, although the store was closed, there 
is no dispute that Defendant and Venson were permitted in the store 
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after closing. Indeed, Venson was even allowed to conduct a 
transaction. Moreover, there was no stated or even implied 
prohibition to the publicfs entering the office. Most telling is 
the fact that the office manager stated that he did not consider 
Defendant's and Vensonfs presence on the premises after hours or 
even Defendant's presence in the office to be an act of trespass 
for which he would have notified authorities. Accordingly, even 
when considering the facts in a light most favorable to the Judge's 
verdict, there is no evidence to support a finding that Defendant 
entered or remained unlawfully on the Deseret Industries premises. 
POINT II 
THE BURGLARY AND THEFT CONSTITUTED A SINGLE 
CRIMINAL EPISODE, BARRING DEFENDANT FROM BEING 
PUNISHED UNDER BOTH PROVISIONS 
Assuming that this Court determines that there was 
sufficient evidence to support the burglary conviction, it must 
then consider whether the lower court properly imposed consecutive 
terms of incarceration for the two offenses. 
Section 76-1-402 of the Utah Code provides that when the 
act of a defendant under a single criminal episode would "establish 
offenses which may be punished in different ways under different 
provisions" of the criminal code, he can only be punished under 
one such provision. Utah Code Ann., § 76-1-402(1) (1995). 
In the instant case, the Court conceded that the acts of 
8 
Defendant constituted a "single criminal episode." (Tr. of 7/7/97, 
10.) See alsof Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401 (Supp. 1997). 
Although burglary is not a lesser included offense of 
theft or visa versa, and Defendant may be constitutionally 
convicted of both offenses, Duran v. Cook, 788 P.2d 1038 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990), in this case, he should not be punished for both 
offenses. Under the facts of this case, the theft establishes an 
essential element of the burglary and, without the burglary, there 
would be no theft. Accordingly, Defendant should be punished under 
only one of the offenses and the sentences should run concurrent. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the above argument, this Court should reverse 
the conviction of the Defendant for burglary. Alternatively, this 
Court should vacate the judgment of the lower court and remand for 
the purposes of entry of a judgment and sentence committing 
Defendant to serve concurrent terms of incarceration for burglary 
and theft. 
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A D D E N D U M 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
ROY LEE GLASPER, ] 
Defendant. ] 
\ JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, 
AND COMMITMENT 
> Criminal No. 971500079 
) Judge J. Philip Eves 
ihe Defendant, KO\ Lbb uLASPER, having been convicted pursuant to a non-jury trial 
of the offenses of BURGLARY, a Third-Degree Felony, and THEFT, a Third-Degree Felony, on 
April 2, 1997, and the Court having entered said verdicts of guilty and thereafter having ordered the 
preparation of a presentence investigation report and after said report was prepared and presented 
to the Court, the ( ourt having called the aln ivt -entitled matter on for sentencing on Jul) 7, 1997, in 
Parowan, Utah, and the above-named Defendant, ROY LEE GLASPER, having appeared before the 
Court in person together with his attorney of record. J. Bryan Jackson, and the State of Utah having 
appeared by and through Iron County Attorney Scott M. Bums, and the Court having heard 
statements from the Defendant, his attorney, and the Iron County Attorney, and the Court having 
reviewed the presentence investigation report and the file in detail, and being fully advised in the 
premises now makes and enters the following Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment, to wit: 
FILED 
JUL 2 1 1997 
, 5th DISTRICT COURT 
P < IRON COUNTY 
[x / Deputy Clerk 
JUDGMENT 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant, ROY LEE 
GLASPER, has been convicted of the offenses of BURGLARY, a Third-Degree Felony, and 
THEFT, a Third-Degree Felony, and the Court having asked whether the Defendant had anything 
to say in regard to why judgment should not be pronounced, and no sufficient cause to the contrary 
being shown or appearing to the Court, it is adjudged that the Defendant is guilty as charged and 
convicted. 
SENTENCE 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant, ROY LEE GLASPER, and pursuant to his 
conviction of BURGLARY, a Third-Degree Felony, is hereby sentenced to a term of imprisonment 
for a period of zero (0) to five (5) years, and the Defendant is hereby placed in the custody of the 
Utah Department of Corrections. 
i'l IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, ROY LEE GLASPER, and pursuant to his 
conviction of THEFT, a Third-Degree Felony, is hereby sentenced to a term of imprisonment for a 
period of zero (0) to five (5) years, and the Defendant is hereby placed in the custody of the Utah 
Department of Corrections. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the temis of imprisonment set forth above shall be served 
consecutively. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no fine shall be imposed. 
COMMITMENT 
TO THE SHERIFF OF IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH: 
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to take the Defendant, ROY LEE GLASPER, and 
- 2 -
deliver him to the Utah State Prison in Draper, Utah, there to be kept and confined in accordance 
with the above and foregoing Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment. 
DATED this. day of July, 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
J. PHILIP EVES (f 
J0ss&4 
District Court, Judge 
CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF IRON ) 
I, CAROLYN BULLOCH, Clerk of the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Iron County, 
State of Utah, hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true, and exact copy of the original 
Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment in the case entitled State of Utah vs. Roy Lee Glasper, 
Criminal No. 971500079, now on file and of record in my office. 
WITNESS my hand and the seal of said office in Cedar City, County of Iron, State of Utah, 
this ^ '\ day of July, 1997. 
CAROLYN BUi * r\c 
( S I' <\ I ) 
CAROLYN BULLOCH 
District Court Clerk 
Rv: • '//:-Cn . f / .... 
Deputy DistrictJ?ourt Clerk 
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